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differentiate between asset illiquidity and misreporting-based explanations. We find that funds using less
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however, such as removing the manager from the setting and reporting of the fund's net asset value and
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respect to asset illiquidity versus misreporting, investment style and portfolio characteristics explain
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Several studies find substantial positive serial correlation in the self‐reported monthly
returns of hedge funds. Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) attribute this “anomalous” serial
correlation either to funds holding illiquid assets in their portfolios or to the intentional
smoothing of reported performance by hedge fund managers. Several recent studies further
examine the statistical properties of hedge fund returns to determine the extent of intentional
smoothing and misreporting (see, for example, Bollen and Pool 2008 and 2009, and Agarwal,
Daniel, and Naik 2009). These studies confirm the anomalous properties of hedge fund returns
across the various investment styles, but they observe neither the characteristics of the funds’
portfolios nor the discretion that managers possess in the performance reporting process.
Hence, the extent to which these anomalous properties are driven by intentional misreporting
as opposed to illiquid assets remains an open empirical question.
This question is of economic importance because intentional smoothing can reduce the
observed volatility of returns, thereby distorting commonly used risk adjusted performance
measures such as Sharpe ratios and market betas. Fung et al. (2008) find that risk adjusted
performance is a major determinant of hedge fund capital flows. Therefore, fund managers
have incentives to increase their funds’ observed risk adjusted performance because they
receive a percentage of assets under management (Getmansky , Lo, and Makarov 2004). In
addition, actions that delay the reporting of poor performance can decrease the likelihood that
investors will immediately withdraw capital, thereby allowing a manager to continue collecting
fees and to possibly benefit from future positive shocks to performance. Moreover, intentional
smoothing can lead to wealth transfers among entering and exiting investors in the same way
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that stale prices can lead to wealth transfers among mutual fund investors (Boudoukh et al.
2002).
We investigate the association between hedge funds’ pricing controls and the statistical
properties of their self‐reported returns. We define pricing controls as the mechanisms used to
value, verify, and report the level and change in a fund’s asset values. Some examples are the
use of external parties to value individual investment positions, the use of external service
providers to aggregate the values of individual investment positions to form the fund’s official
net asset value (NAV), and the use of reputable auditors. We posit that returns of hedge funds
with more stringent controls over pricing, asset valuations, and reporting are less likely to have
statistical properties that are consistent with manipulation after controlling for other fund
characteristics such as investment style and portfolio characteristics.
To observe pricing controls and portfolio characteristics we use a proprietary database
of hedge fund due diligence reports prepared by HedgeFundDueDiligence.com (HFDD). These
reports provide an extensive array of detail regarding fund characteristics, pricing controls,
reporting mechanisms, asset valuation mechanisms, and asset liquidity. We match these due
diligence reports with the returns that the sample funds reported to the three largest
commercial databases of hedge fund returns. Using these self‐reported returns, we estimate
three measures of smoothing and find that all three vary systematically with the discretion that
fund managers possess in setting and reporting performance. In other words, some of the
smoothness in reported returns can be explained by cross‐sectional variation in the pricing
controls that constrain the managers’ discretion in pricing investment positions.
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We find that the returns are smoother for funds that provide managers with greater
discretion in sourcing the prices used to value the fund’s investment positions. For the various
sources, we find the lowest level of serial correlation in the returns of funds that source prices
primarily from exchange quotes, while we find the highest of levels of smoothing in the returns
of funds that use either dealer quotes or prices determined by the manager.
We next examine the extent to which who prices the positions is associated with our
smoothing measures. We find that returns are smoother for funds in which the manager prices
investment positions with no external oversight. The economic magnitude of who prices on
smoothed performance is, however, smaller than that of the pricing sources. Nevertheless, the
smoothness of reported returns increases in the discretion that the manager possesses in
reporting performance.
Finally, more reputable auditors and administrators are not associated with lower levels
of smoothing. This finding is not surprising in the hedge fund setting given that the primary
responsibility of the auditor is evaluating the fund’s annual financial statement as opposed to
evaluating the fund’s monthly performance reports. We also do not find lower levels of
smoothing in the returns of funds in which the manager is not involved in setting and reporting
the fund’s official NAV to investors. Overall, the reputation of those who calculate and review
the fund’s financial statements and NAV play a relatively smaller role in the reduction of
misreporting in monthly returns than do the sources of prices and who prices the fund’s
investment positions.
With respect to the economic magnitude of intentional smoothing, we find that
investment style and portfolio characteristics explain 14.0–24.3 percent of the variation in our
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three smoothing measures. Pricing controls explain an additional 4.1–8.8 percent, suggesting
that asset illiquidity is the major factor driving the anomalous properties of self‐reported hedge
fund returns. Our findings are robust to varying the estimation periods and to examining the
effects of controls within investment styles and other fund characteristics. We further
corroborate our results by examining the distributions of self‐reported monthly returns and
find, consistent with intentional manipulation, that funds with either dealer‐sourced or
manager‐provided prices are more likely to report slightly positive than slightly negative
returns.
This study extends the hedge fund literature on anomalous return properties by
estimating the magnitudes of intentional smoothing. Our estimates assist investors or
researchers who use self‐reported hedge fund returns to evaluate hedge fund investment
opportunities and/or hedge funds as an asset class. Furthermore, recent research documents an
illiquidity premium in hedge fund returns (see, for example, Aragon 2007, and Khandani and
Lo 2009). These studies use the same smoothing measures to estimate the illiquidity of assets
held in hedge fund portfolios. We provide insight into the extent that such an illiquidity
premium is associated with the actual illiquidity of the fund’s underlying assets as opposed to
misreporting by hedge fund managers. Finally, by examining the extent of intentional
smoothing, we inform the current debate about proposed changes in hedge fund regulation.
Furthermore, several features make hedge funds a powerful setting to investigate the
effect of managerial valuation discretion on reported performance. First, prior research on the
effectiveness of pricing controls is primarily limited to publicly traded firms for whom most
pricing controls are mandated by regulation and generally accepted accounting principles
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(GAAP). In contrast, hedge funds exercise substantial discretion in the use and choice of explicit
pricing controls and reporting mechanisms. Second, the managerial incentives to manipulate
asset valuations and reported performance are far clearer in investment vehicles than in
operating firms (Chandar and Bricker 2002). For example, all hedge fund managers have an
incentive to undertake smoothing. In contrast, it is not clear whether all managers of operating
firms have incentives to smooth (for a discussion, see Dechow, Ge, and Schrand 2009). We also
contribute to the current debate on “mark to market” accounting by demonstrating how pricing
controls affect the valuation of investment positions and highlighting the practical
consequences of allowing managers to obtain from apparently objective sources, such as dealer
quotes (Laux and Leuz 2009).

1. Background
1.1 Hedge Fund Setting
Hedge funds are managed investment vehicles. Some stylistic features of hedge funds
include: they are often privately held, generally comprised of wealthy individuals and
institutional investors, and typically organized in the U.S. as limited partnerships and offshore
as corporations (Fung and Hsieh 1999). There has been substantial growth in the hedge fund
industry, both in the number of funds and in assets under management (Brown, Goetzmann,
and Ibbotson 1999; Fung and Hsieh 1999; Lo 2008).
Unlike other investment vehicles, hedge fund managers generally structure their funds
to avoid reporting requirements imposed by regulators (Lhabitant 2008 page 405). For example,
hedge funds are structured to be exempt from the periodic reporting obligations of the
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the registration requirements of the Investment Company
Act of 1940 (Oesterle 2008). Therefore, a more descriptive definition of a hedge fund is an
investment fund exempt from a list of specific federal acts regulating investment vehicles
(Oesterle 2008). This minimal regulatory environment provides hedge funds with substantially
greater discretion in their operations, especially regarding the valuation and reporting of fund
assets and performance, compared to regulated investment vehicles, such as mutual funds
(McVea 2008b). For example, hedge funds are not required to have their assets independently
valued (McVea 2008a).
The offering circular or “private placement memorandum” (PPM) documents the
controls employed by the hedge fund to value and report the fund’s performance to investors.
In addition to these controls, the PPM and the subsequent executable limited partnership and
subscription agreements lay out other fund operations and the investor’s contractual rights
including: the fees agreed to be paid, the terms under which the investor can invest and
withdraw funds, and the investor’s ability to monitor the fund (ABA 2005 pages 96–98). Given
that hedge funds are substantively exempt from securities regulations, the terms provided in
the PPM and subsequent executable agreements represent virtually all of the pricing controls in
place for the investor’s hedge fund investment.
1.2 Anomalous Properties of Hedge Fund Returns
Recent research documents unusual properties in reported hedge fund returns. Below
we provide a brief overview of the key findings from this research. A critical feature of this
research is the extent to which research designs can distinguish opportunistic manipulation
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from explanations related to the fund’s underlying investment style, the manager’s skill, and/or
the illiquidity of the fund’s investment positions.
Asness, Krail, and Liew (2001) argue that hedge fund managers can reduce estimates of
fund exposure to systematic risk by exploiting the flexibility they possess in valuing assets at
month‐end. Specifically, by using stale prices in setting the fund’s NAV, a manager can reduce
estimates of the fund’s market beta and increase the smoothness of the fund’s return series.
When they include both current and lagged S&P 500 Index returns in a simple market model
regression, they find substantially higher systematic risk exposure in hedge fund returns than
when they only include the current month’s S&P Index return. They interpret this evidence as
consistent with either the illiquidity of the fund’s assets or misreporting by fund managers.
Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) develop a model of smoothed returns to explain
cross‐sectional variation in serial correlation in reported hedge fund returns. They observe the
highest serial correlation in investment styles that typically invest in illiquid assets.
Furthermore, they use simulations to rule out alternative explanations for serial correlation that
are related to time varying expected returns, time varying leverage, and high water marks in
incentive fees. Given that they lack fund‐level information about accounting conventions and
operational structure, they are unable to distinguish between serial correlation being driven by
the underlying illiquidity of the assets or intentional smoothing by fund managers.
Bollen and Pool (2008) attempt to distinguish between the manipulation and illiquidity
explanations of smoothing by using a serial correlation measure that allows for varying effects
of good and bad news. Specifically, they present a model in which a fund manager fully reports
gains but delays reporting losses, thereby leading to conditional serial correlation in reported
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risk‐adjusted returns. Consistent with fund managers possessing incentives to report good
news and delay bad news they find empirical evidence of conditional serial correlation. Further,
they find mixed evidence that the observed serial correlation varies by whether the fund has
been audited or not. Nevertheless, they do not control for the underlying liquidity of funds’
asset portfolios and do not observe the discretion that managers possess in reporting
performance.
Our study extends prior research on hedge fund return smoothing by examining
whether the association between pricing controls and reported returns is consistent with
intentional manipulation. Furthermore, our data allow us to distinguish between asset
illiquidity‐based explanations and misreporting‐based explanations for the anomalous
properties in reported hedge fund returns. Consequently, we can directly investigate how
managerial discretion in pricing controls affects the properties of hedge fund returns.
1.3 Pricing Controls
We define pricing controls as mechanisms used to value, verify, and disclose the level
and change in a fund’s investment positions and official NAV. We classify pricing controls into
four categories. The sources of prices used to value the fund’s investment positions comprise
the first category. The second category consists of who prices the individual investment
positions. The third relates to who calculates and reports the portfolio’s NAV to investors. The
fourth category relates to the reputation of the service providers who prepare and review the
valuations provided to fund investors.
Hedge funds obtain periodic valuations of their investment positions from several
sources. Common sources include exchanges and Over‐The‐Counter (OTC) markets, whereby
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valuations are based on market prices, such as the last trade or a function of the most recent bid
and ask. Hedge funds can also obtain values based on quotes solicited from dealers. The
practitioner literature suggests that even for hard to value assets, such as complex and illiquid
assets, many hedge funds obtain prices from market‐based and dealer‐based quotes (MFA
2009). Hedge funds can also determine valuations by using proprietary financial models and
internally generated prices, whereby fund managers, themselves, determine the value of
investment positions (President’s Working Group 2008 page 47). Internally generated prices
allow managers to exercise professional judgment and to incorporate all available information
into the asset valuation. This approach, however, provides managers with the greatest
opportunity to manipulate asset values.
Practitioner surveys show that no one method has emerged as a dominant methodology
for any asset class and that there is substantial heterogeneity in the pricing of similar assets
across various hedge funds (Deloitte 2007 page 16). The source of prices is an important issue in
the valuation process. For example, the Alternative Investment Management Association found
that 41 percent of surveyed hedge fund managers, service providers, and investors regard
pricing sources as the main challenge to pricing investment assets (AIMA 2005 page 6).
Hedge funds also possess discretion with respect to who obtains the values for the
funds’ investments. The simplest approach is for the fund manager to obtain the prices for each
investment position. In practice, however, the majority of hedge funds employ external services
to value their investment positions. These external services can be used exclusively to price the
portfolio without any intervention from the fund manager. As an alternative, a fund manager
can collaborate with an external pricing service to value investment positions. Finally, some
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hedge funds employ multiple external entities to value investment positions. Industry best
practice is for independent external service providers to value the fund’s investment positions
(AIMA 2005 page 7; Deloitte 2007 page 16; President’s Working Group 2008).
The entity that sets and reports the fund’s official NAV to investors can differ from the
entity that prices the individual investment positions. Pricing is done on a position by position
basis; while NAV is determined by aggregating the prices of the individual investment
positions. While pricing takes place on a regular and frequent basis, the NAV is typically
estimated and reported to investors monthly. The most objective approach is to remove the
manager from determining and reporting the fund’s official NAV (President’s Working Group
2008). Nevertheless, some funds allow the manager to calculate and report the NAV alone,
while other funds opt for a collaborative approach with a third party, usually an administrator.
The final category of pricing controls consists of the quality and reputation of the fund’s
service providers, specifically its auditor and administrator. Similar to engagements with
publicly traded firms, auditors undertake annual audits of hedge funds to ensure that the
financial information provided to investors complies with the relevant accounting standards.
The role of fund administrators varies substantially across engagements. They typically provide
back‐office support, such as performing day‐to‐day administrative operations and accounting
and valuation services, and serving as the interface with investors (SEC 2003 page 56). In many
cases the administrator also calculates the NAV using data provided by either the fund’s
custodian or prime broker (Lhabitant 2008). We posit that hedge fund third party service
providers with valuable reputations have incentives to reduce financial misstatements and
returns manipulation.
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We posit that more extensive pricing controls decrease the bias and increase the
precision of asset valuations and reported returns made to hedge fund investors. The use of
external parties and objective sources to value investment positions and the use of independent
and reputable service providers to report and verify the NAV provide the most objective
measurements of fund performance, thereby reducing the likelihood of manipulation.
Therefore, we posit that hedge funds with these more stringent pricing controls are less likely to
have returns consistent with manipulation, namely have lower levels of serial correlation and
smoothing in their self‐reported returns.
Nevertheless, there are several institutional features that can limit the ability of pricing
controls to reduce deliberate smoothing of reported returns. For example, while exchange and
market‐based quotes are generally appropriate for liquid assets, the use of market‐based
sources for thinly traded and hard‐to‐value assets is more problematic and can result in
unreliable estimates (Deloitte 2007 page 15). In less liquid or thinly traded markets, such as
over‐the‐counter markets, the practitioner literature documents how investment managers can
manipulate reported performance through the strategic selling of assets around periods of
valuation (Spurgin 2001; Weisman 2002). Hence, some assets are likely to be susceptible to
manipulation, regardless of the objectivity of the pricing control in effect.
For example, the use of dealers to provide valuations can allow managers to “dealer
shop,” i.e., approach various dealers for quotes and employ the quote that is most consistent
with the fund manager’s objectives or request and receive a desired quote from the fund’s
dealer (Scholtes and Tett 2007). Even valuation models that appear mechanical and, therefore,
not open to opportunism can rely on assumptions that suppress volatility and induce
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smoothing (Skeel and Partnoy 2007). Furthermore, the repeated use of the same valuation
methodology month after month can consistently understate the volatility of returns associated
with the invested asset (McVea 2008a page 11).
The ability of service providers, such as administrators and auditors, to prevent or detect
opportunistic smoothing in monthly returns is likely to be limited by the scope and focus of
their duties. For example, many auditors of hedge funds do not review how funds value their
investment positions (Lhabitant 2008 page 105). When auditors do review how funds value
their assets, the sampling tests are less comprehensive than the standards for registered
investment companies (SEC 2003 page 66). Furthermore, the audit engagement typically focuses
on the accuracy of financial year end valuations, rather than on the month‐to‐month valuations.
Consistent with audits only affecting year end returns, Bollen and Pool (2009) report that
manipulation of reported returns is more likely in months not surrounding an audit. In
addition, while the practitioner literature strongly advocates against allowing fund managers to
perform final valuations or to communicate their valuations to an administrator (Lhabitant 2008
page 100), some authors suggest that for assets with no simple or accepted valuation approach,
administrators often accept the valuation provided by the fund manager, thereby limiting the
benefit of external service providers that value individual investment positions and/or
determine and report the fund’s official NAV (for a discussion, see McVea 2008a).
Finally, the role of pricing controls can be limited because investment style explains a
significant amount of observed serial correlation in hedge fund returns (Getmansky, Lo, and
Makarov 2004). Regardless of the pricing controls in place, the characteristics of the fund’s
investments may drive the explanatory component of observed smoothing, and non‐asset
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illiquidity explanations may be of secondary importance. Therefore, the extent that pricing
controls reduce intentional smoothing is an empirical question.

2. Sample and Empirical Measures
2.1 Sample
We use both proprietary and commercial data sources to investigate hedge fund pricing
controls and reported returns. We start with a database of 427 due diligence reports prepared
by HedgeFundDueDiligence.com (HFDD). HFDD prepared the reports over the period 2003–
2007. Investors commissioned these reports to assist them in evaluating whether to invest in the
funds. HFDD specializes exclusively in hedge fund due diligence and obtains the information
contained in these reports from several sources, including on‐site visits and interviews with key
staff, discussions with service providers, review of offering memorandums, examinations of
public filings and registrations, verifications of key staff backgrounds, and auditor and
accounting reviews. Consequently, the HFDD database overcomes potential concerns related to
commercial databases that are based on self‐reported fund and manager characteristics. The
HFDD reports provide an extensive array of detail regarding fund and manager characteristics,
portfolio characteristics, pricing controls, and contract terms.
Next, we merge these funds with monthly returns reported on at least one of the three
major commercial databases: Lipper‐TASS, Hedge Fund Research, and CISDM. 1 Lipper TASS is
commonly used for empirical investigations of hedge fund returns (for a detailed description,

To ensure exemption from federal regulation, hedge funds are prohibited from any form of general solicitation or
advertising of their services to the general public (ABA 2005 pages 214–5; Lhabitant 2008). Hence, commercial
databases are a primary method that funds use to market themselves to potential investors.
1
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see Lo, 2008). Hedge Fund Research and CISDM are also used in academic research but to a
lesser extent (for discussion of the Hedge Fund Research and CISDM databases and their
overlaps in fund coverage with Lipper TASS, see Agarwal et al. 2009). When funds report to
multiple databases, we obtain returns first from the Lipper‐TASS database, then Hedge Fund
Research, and finally CISDM. After we require at least 12 months of returns and that the
smoothing measures converge, our sample consists of 260 funds. 2 The distribution of fund
returns by commercial database is as follows: Lipper‐TASS, 158 funds; Hedge Fund Research,
72 funds; and CISDM, 30 funds. 3 The returns cover the period starting in July 1990 and ending
in January 2009 with the mean fund having 66 months of self‐reported returns.
2.2 Investment Style and Portfolio Characteristics
Asset illiquidity varies with investment style. For example, funds that invest in
convertible arbitrage typically hold less liquid assets than funds that follow an equity‐based
long/short strategy. Therefore, we create indicator variables for the major hedge fund
investment styles to control for the mean illiquidity of each investment style. Because style
designations vary across the three commercial databases, we create a series of combined
classifications based on ten investment styles, namely: Convertible Arbitrage, Emerging
Markets, Equity Market Neutral, Event Driven, Fixed Income, Macro, Long/Short Equity, Multi‐

The smoothing measures do not converge for 10 funds that have at least 12 months of returns.
To investigate the robustness of our findings to our sample requirement of at least 12 months of returns, we repeat
the analysis for the 259 funds with at least 18 months of returns and for the 256 funds with at least 24 months of
returns. The results using these alternative sample criteria are quantitatively similar, suggesting our findings are not
driven by the sample criteria.
2
3
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Strategy, Fund of Funds, and Miscellaneous. 4 Appendix A reconciles our classifications with
those of the commercial databases. 5
Table 1 Panel A provides descriptive detail on the funds’ investment styles and portfolio
characteristics. With respect to investment style, the most prevalent type in our sample is
Long/Short Equity (29 percent). The remaining styles range from Equity Market Neutral (3
percent) to Event Driven (15 percent). Compared with the sample of hedge funds used in
Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004), our distribution of investment styles is similar except that
it is more weighted toward Long/Short Equity (18 percent in their sample).
With respect to the liquidity of the investment positions in the hedge funds’ portfolios,
HFDD examines the portfolios to determine the typical number of investment positions held at
any one time and the typical duration that a fund holds an investment position. We find
substantial variation in the number of investment positions typically held in the funds’
portfolios with 42 percent holding fewer than 40 positions, and three percent holding 1,000 or
more positions. We also find variation in our sample funds’ typical holding periods for the
investments, with 10 percent of the funds holding investment positions for only days, and 35
percent holding their investment positions for more than a year.
2.3 Pricing Controls
Table 1 Panel B reports the descriptive statistics for the least objective pricing controls
implemented by our sample funds. 6 We find substantial variation in the source of prices used to

Although the classifications Equity Market Neutral and Long/Short Equity appear similar, the TASS and CISDM
databases classify them separately.
5 Several of the funds classified by CISDM as Multi Strategy also report returns to Lipper‐TASS and HFR. For those
funds, Lipper‐TASS and Hedge Fund Research consistently classify these funds as Fund of Funds. We therefore
include the CISDM Multi Strategy style in our Fund of Funds classification.
4
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value funds’ investment positions. Exchange quotes are used by 31 percent of the funds, over‐
the‐counter (OTC) quotes are used by five percent of the funds, and dealer quotes are used by
36 percent. Regarding internal valuation sources, we find 12 percent of our sample funds use
model‐based prices; while in 15 percent, fund managers generate prices internally with no
external oversight.
With respect to who prices the portfolio, we observe that nine percent of funds use at least
one internal source and one external service to price investment positions (Dual/Triple Entity),
while 60 percent use only external services to price the portfolio (Administrator Only). 7 We also
find that 12 percent of funds use collaborative pricing (Collaborative), whereby an external
pricing service collaborates with the fund manager to determine the value of the fund’s
individual investment positions. Finally, 20 percent of the funds in the sample obtain prices
internally with no external oversight (Manager Only).
With respect to who sets and reports the funds’ NAV to investors, the majority of funds
(84 percent) have no manager involvement in the determination and reporting of the NAV. To
represent the quality and reputation of the service providers employed by our funds, we use
annual hedge fund industry‐specific rankings of audit firms and administrators. We obtain
these rankings from Institutional Investor’s Alpha Survey, which is based on voting by industry
participants. All funds in the sample are audited, but there is heterogeneity in auditor quality
and reputation. We use industry‐specific rankings because hedge fund auditing may require
specialized skills that differ from those required to audit publicly traded firms. We find that 78

We use the least objective source to best capture the discretion that fund managers have when obtaining asset
values.
7 HFDD ranks Dual/Triple Entity pricing as the most stringent control over who prices investment positions.
6
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percent of our funds employ auditors ranked by Alpha Magazine, while 32 percent of our funds
employ ranked administrators.
2.4 Pricing Controls Classified by Style and Portfolio Characteristics
Table 2 reports the pricing controls tabulated by the funds’ investment styles and the
liquidity of their investments. We observe substantial variation in pricing controls across funds
with similar investment styles and portfolio characteristics. These differences are consistent
with practitioner surveys and prior research that finds wide variation in the pricing controls
used by hedge funds even within similar investment characteristics (Deloitte 2007; McVea
2008a). Nevertheless, pricing controls vary with investment style and portfolio characteristics.
For example, 92 percent of the Convertible Arbitrage funds in our sample obtain prices
primarily from dealers, while 88 percent of Equity Market Neutral funds use Exchange‐based
prices. Therefore, we control for investment style and portfolio characteristics in our
multivariate tests. Moreover, in robustness tests, we partition the sample on fund investment
characteristics. The extent to which pricing controls are predetermined by a fund’s
characteristics will reduce the likelihood of observing significant differences in smoothed
reported performance attributable to pricing controls.
2.5 Smoothing Measures
In this sub‐section, we discuss the three measures used to investigate smoothing of
returns. Hedge fund returns exhibit greater serial correlation than returns on other investment
securities and portfolios (for a discussion, see Lo 2008). Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004)
investigate several potential reasons for the high serial correlations and conclude that the two
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most likely reasons are asset illiquidity and managerial manipulation. Therefore, our first
smoothing measure is the monthly serial correlation in reported returns ρ̂1 (Serial Correlation).
To investigate the potential sources of serial correlation in reported returns, Getmansky,
Lo, and Makarov (2004) assume that hedge funds do not report true economic returns. Instead,
funds report a monthly observed return RtO that is a weighted average of the fund’s true
economic returns Rt over the most recent k + 1 months:
RtO = θ 0 Rt + θ 1 Rt − 1 + " + θ k Rt − k

1 = θ 0 + θ1 + " + θ k

This process is consistent with either managers estimating holding period returns on
illiquid assets and/or manipulating reported returns. Under this process serial correlation in
observed returns depends on the θ k ’s:
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Note that the process does not affect expected returns. It does, however, lead to
observed volatilities that are lower than actual volatilities and observed Sharpe Ratios that are
greater than actual Sharpe Ratios: 8
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Therefore, managers who follow such a smoothing process can improve their fund’s observed
risk adjusted performance, which has been shown by Fung et al. (2008) to be a major
determinant of capital flows. This process is, however, also consistent with the pricing of
illiquid assets (Kadlec and Patterson 1999; Fisher, Gatzlaff, Geltner, and Haurin 2003). For
example, non‐synchronous trading of assets can introduce serial correlation into returns
(Scholes and Williams 1977; Dimson 1979). Moreover, Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) find
that serial correlation in hedge fund reported monthly returns varies by the liquidity of the
fund’s investment style.
To estimate the coefficients of the smoothing process, we follow Getmansky, Lo, and
Makarov (2004) by using Maximum Likelihood to estimate a Moving Average model with two
lags. Specifically, they define the demeaned return process as:
X t = RtO − μ

They then assume that actual monthly performance innovations are normally distributed,
leading to the following properties:
Xt = θ 0ηt + θ1ηt −1 + θ 2ηt − 2

1 = θ 0 + θ1 + θ 2

η k ~ Nor(0,σ η2 )
We then transform the estimated coefficients by dividing each θˆi by 1 + θˆ1 + θˆ2 to
normalize them. Our second empirical smoothing measure is the first coefficient θˆ0 (Theta

8 Spurgin (2001) and Weisman (2002) describe hedge fund trading strategies that smooth returns with the express
purpose of decreasing a fund’s observed volatility and increasing its Sharpe Ratio. Such strategies may affect both
expected returns and volatility.
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Coefficient) from the above estimation. The economic interpretation of this coefficient is the
percentage of the month’s actual performance innovation that is included in the month’s
reported return.
As a summary statistic for the smoothing process, Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004)
suggest using a Herfindahl Index to measure the concentration of the θ k weights:
k

ξ = ∑θ j2
j =0

We use ξˆ estimated with two lags as our third empirical measure of smoothing and refer to it
further as the Smoothing Index. Lower values of ξ represent greater smoothing.
Appendix B presents an example of how such a MA(2) smoothing process decreases the
fund’s observed standard deviation, and increases the serial correlation and risk adjusted
performance of the fund. The example uses 100 simulated monthly hedge fund returns
generated from a Normal Distribution with a mean of one percent and a standard deviation of
2.5 percent. The simulated monthly returns are then smoothed according to the following
MA(2) process:
rettSmooth = 0.7 rett + 0.2 rett − 1 + 0.1rett − 2

This smoothing process corresponds to a θ 0 of 0.70 and a ξ of 0.54, which are similar to Lo’s
(2007) estimates for convertible arbitrage funds. Although the mean return for the smoothed
series is only slightly higher than the unsmoothed mean (0.866 percent compared to 0.864
percent), the smoothing process decreases the observed standard deviation by 27 percent (from
2.234 to 1.634) and increases the Sharpe Ratio by 36 percent (from 0.387 to 0.526), implying an
economically significant increase in observed risk‐adjusted performance. Furthermore, the first
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order serial correlation increases from ‐0.049 to 0.262 and becomes significantly different from
zero at the 0.01 level.
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the three smoothing measures applied to our
sample’s fund returns. We winsorize all three measures to the 0.5 and 99.5 percentiles to remove
the effects of outliers. The mean serial correlation for our sample funds is 0.250 and its standard
deviation is 0.300. For comparison, the serial correlation in monthly returns for the S&P 500
Index over the same period is ‐0.005. 9 The mean Theta Coefficient for the funds in the sample is
0.767, implying that, on average, approximately three quarters of each month’s observed return
represents an innovation to fund performance. The mean Smoothing Index is 0.694, and the
standard deviation of this measure is 0.301.
Panel B presents the Pearson correlations among the three measures. Although there are
differences in the number of months covered by the three measures, all three are highly
correlated. For example, the correlation between Serial Correlation and Theta Coefficient is ‐
0.838, and the correlation between Theta Coefficient and Smoothing Index is 0.960. In the
empirical analyses, we use all three measures because of differences in the number of months’
returns that the measures take into account.

3. Empirical Tests

A potential explanation for serial correlation in hedge fund returns is that funds pursue momentum strategies. To
investigate this possibility, we estimated the monthly serial correlation in the momentum factors over the period
starting January 1978 and ending September 2008. The monthly serial correlation over this period is ‐0.017 and is not
significantly different from zero. We obtain the momentum factor from Ken French’s website:
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
9
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Consistent with prior research on hedge funds, to identify the effect of pricing controls,
we assume that the fund’s investment style is constant over the period for which we have self‐
reported returns. This assumption is reasonable given that fund managers typically start a new
fund rather than change the investment style of an existing fund (for a discussion see Agarwal
et al. 2009). With respect to pricing controls, we assume that they are constant over the sample
period because they are typically defined in the fund’s PPM and consequently require investor
approval to change (Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft 1999; Cassar and Gerakos 2009).
3.1 Univariate Findings
Table 4 compares the means of the smoothing measures across the various pricing
controls. Starting with the source of prices, we find sources that involve greater managerial
discretion have smoother returns than those with less discretion. For example, the returns of
funds in which the manager sets prices have a mean Serial Correlation of 0.326, while the
returns of funds in which prices are exchanged‐based have a mean Serial Correlation of 0.139.
The means for these two pricing sources are significantly different at the 0.01 level for all three
of our smoothing measures. Furthermore, we observe for all three smoothing measures the
same ordering in smoothing magnitudes, from most to least: Manager Provided, Dealer Quotes,
Model Based, OTC Quotes, and Exchange Quotes. The higher levels of smoothing for Manager‐
Provided and Dealer Quotes are consistent with managers using discretion when personally
pricing assets and with managers “dealer shopping” quotes to smooth reported performance.
When we tabulate the smoothing measures by who prices the fund’s investment
positions, we find a similar pattern. Pricing controls that provide managers with greater
discretion are associated with smoother returns than those that allow managers less discretion
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or involve greater external oversight. For example, funds in which the manager prices
investment positions with no external oversight have a mean Smoothing Index (Theta
Coefficient) of ‐0.632 (0.732), while the mean Smoothing Index (Theta Coefficient) for funds that
use Dual/Triple Entity Pricing is ‐0.825 (0.843). The means for these two alternative pricing
controls for all three smoothing measures are significantly different at the 0.05 level.
Finally, we compare the means of the smoothing measures conditional on whether the
fund uses a reputable auditor or administrator, and whether the manager is involved in setting
and reporting the fund’s NAV to investors. Means across these traditional internal controls are
not significantly different at the 0.10 level.
3.2 Multivariate Findings
Table 5 presents benchmark ordinary least squares regressions modeling our three
smoothing measures: Serial Correlation, Theta Coefficient, and Smoothing Index. 10 These
regressions include control variables that proxy for investment style and portfolio
characteristics. Specifically, we include indicator variables for the investment styles and
indicator variables for the typical number of investment positions, the typical investment
durations, and whether the fund is located offshore.
The coefficients on our investment style measures for the Theta Coefficient and
Smoothing Index are similar to those presented by Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004).
Consistent with their results, we find negative and significant coefficients on the following

We estimate the smoothing measures separately from the cross‐sectional regressions. An alternative approach
would be to estimate them jointly using the Generalized Method of Moments. Note, however, that the median
number of months used to estimate fund‐level serial correlation is 72, implying a standard error of 0.014 (Brockwell
and Davis 1991), which is smaller than nearly all of the standard errors of the coefficients presented in the Column 1
10
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investment styles: Convertible Arbitrage, Emerging Markets, Event Driven, and Fund of Funds.
Furthermore, the overall explanatory power of our models is consistent with previous empirical
evidence (Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov 2004; Lo 2008). For example, our models without
pricing controls explain 24.3 percent of the variation in Serial Correlation, 14.6 percent of the
variation in the Smoothing Index, and 18.1 percent of the variation in Theta Coefficient.
Table 6 Panels A, B, and C present regressions modeling our three smoothing measures
as a function of the fund’s pricing controls. In the presented models, we exclude the pricing
control that we posit provides the least discretion for fund managers to manipulate reported
performance. Therefore, the coefficient on each pricing control represents additional smoothing
relative to the most stringent pricing control. The right‐most columns present the full model,
which includes all of the control variables and pricing controls. We report the series of models
to demonstrate how the inclusion/exclusion of the various pricing controls influences the
explanatory power of the overall model and that of the controls variables. We discuss our
findings from Panels A, B, and C jointly below by each of the pricing controls investigated.
Examining the full model for Panel A, we find that the source of prices is significantly
associated with Serial Correlation, with the returns of funds using manager‐based sources
having serial correlations 0.142 higher than the returns of funds that use exchange‐based
sources. We observe similar findings for our Theta Coefficient and Smoothing Index—manager‐
based sources exhibiting significantly greater manipulation in reported returns compared to
exchange‐based sources at the 0.01 level. Consistent with exchange‐based sources being the

of Table 5. Given the magnitude of the standard errors, the benefit of using GMM to estimate both the smoothing
measure and the cross‐sectional regressions is marginal.
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most objective or stringent pricing source, the returns of funds that use model, dealer, and OTC
sources all have significantly higher levels of smoothing than the returns of funds that use
exchange‐based sources.
For all three measures, we observe that returns of funds that use manager‐based sources
have the highest level of smoothing. For example, from the Theta Coefficient results presented
in Panel B, the mean monthly self‐reported return of a fund using manager‐based sources
represents 17.9 percent less of the month’s actual performance innovation than the mean self‐
reported return of a fund that uses exchange‐based sources (p < 0.01), 12.0 percent less than a
fund that uses OTC sources (p < 0.12), 8.6 percent less than model‐based sources (p < 0.08), and
6.0 percent less than dealer‐based sources (p < 0.12). Examining all three measures, in two cases,
the ordering of smoothing from most to least is manager, dealer, model, OTC, and exchange.
These findings are consistent with fund managers using discretion to smooth their funds’
reported performance. Furthermore, the multivariate and univariate results are consistent with
managers dealer‐shopping quotes to smooth reported performance.
We next examine who prices the fund’s investment positions and find evidence
consistent with greater discretion resulting in smoother returns. The highest level of smoothing
is for funds in which the manager prices investment positions with no external oversight. The
economic magnitude of who sets the prices is, however, smaller than that for the pricing
sources, with only two of the smoothing measures being significantly different between funds
in which the manager sets prices with no external oversight and funds that use Dual/Triple
pricing. Nevertheless, the results across the three smoothing measures are consistent with
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observed smoothing increasing monotonically in the manager’s involvement in the pricing of
investment positions.
Consistent with the univariate evidence, we do not find lower levels of smoothing in the
returns of funds that use more reputable service providers and that the exclude the manager
from setting and reporting NAV. These findings suggest that the managerial involvement in the
reporting of the NAV to the fund investors, and the relative reputation of those who calculate
and review the reported fund investments and performance, play a smaller role in the reduction
of hedge fund smoothing than pricing controls related to the source and who prices the fund’s
individual investments. Our results with respect to auditors, administrators, and NAV do not,
however, preclude the possibility these controls affect other outcomes, such as the quality of the
fund’s annual financial statements or the likelihood of fraud.
Examining the relative contribution of our various pricing controls on the additional
explanatory power gained suggests that the source of prices is the most influential in explaining
cross‐sectional variation in the smoothness of self‐reported hedge fund returns. With respect to
asset illiquidity vs. misreporting, the inclusion of pricing controls increases the overall
explanatory power of the models by 4.1 percent (Serial Correlation), 8.1 percent (Theta
Coefficient), and 7.3 percent (Smoothing Index). 11 Nevertheless, the investment style and
portfolio characteristics explain between 14 and 24 percent of the variation in the smoothing
measures, suggesting that asset illiquidity is the major factor that drives the anomalous
properties of self‐reported hedge fund returns.

Note that the R2 for Serial Correlation, Smoothing Index and Theta Coefficient with only the pricing controls are
17.3 percent, 15.2 percent, and 16.9 percent. Therefore, the inclusion of the control variables increases the overall
explanatory power of the models by 11.1 percent, 7.5 percent, and 8.5 percent.
11
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4. Robustness Tests
4.1 Within Typical Holding Period and Typical Number of Positions
The results presented in Tables 5 and 6 also include indicator variables for the typical
periods that funds hold investment positions and the typical number of positions, thereby
controlling for these effects. An alternative approach is to examine the associations among the
pricing controls and smoothing measures within each typical holding period and within each
typical number of positions. An advantage of this approach is that it may better hold the
liquidity of the fund’s portfolio constant. In unreported tests, we carry out such analyses for
sub‐samples based on typical number of positions and typical holding period. Consistent with
the reported results, we find significantly higher levels of smoothing at the 0.10 level for funds
in which the manager is involved in pricing and in which prices are sourced from dealers for all
numbers of positions and for durations of a year, quarter, and month.
4.2 Within Investment Style
The results presented in Tables 5 and 6 include indicator variables for the various
investment styles, several of which are statistically significant. Therefore, the results represent
associations between pricing controls and smoothing when investment style is held constant.
An alternative approach is to examine the associations among the pricing controls and
smoothing measures within the investment style. Several of the styles include only a small
number of funds, and pricing controls cluster within these styles. Nevertheless, we examine the
association between pricing controls and the smoothness measures for Event Driven funds,
which is the largest investment style (38 funds) in our sample.
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Table 7 presents the means of the smoothing measures classified by the source of prices
and by who prices the investment positions. OTC Quotes is excluded from the analysis because
no Event Driven fund in the sample uses OTC Quotes as a source of prices. Consistent with the
results presented in Table 6, within the Event Driven style we find the smoothest returns among
funds in which managers provide prices and funds in which managers price investment
positions with no external oversight. In addition, Dealer Quotes are associated with the next
highest level of smoothing.
4.3 Manager Skill
A hedge fund investment is effectively a bet on the fund manager’s proprietary
investment strategies and/or investing skill (Edwards and Caglayan 2001; Lo 2008). If a fund
manager has greater investment ability, both the manager and the investors are likely to have
incentives to mask the fund’s investment strategy to other investors. One method to reduce the
likelihood of outsiders being able to ascertain the fund’s investment strategy from reported
returns is to allow better managers to smooth returns. But, managers choose whether to self‐
report returns to commercial databases and higher‐ability managers may therefore not report.
Nevertheless, in this section we examine whether the pricing controls are associated with
manager skill.
To investigate this issue we first estimate a measure of fund manager skill, namely the
alphas estimated over the life of the fund. To calculate fund level alphas, we regress each fund’s
monthly returns on Fung and Hsieh’s (2001) eight hedge fund risk factors (the returns of S&P
500, the small capitalization minus large capitalization factor, the bond trend following factor,
the currency trend following factor, the commodity trend following factor, the stock index trend
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following factor, the bond market factor, and the credit spread factor). 12 The intercept from each
fund level regression represents the fund’s alpha.
Table 8 tabulates the means for sample funds’ alphas by the various pricing controls. We
observe no obvious association between discretion in reporting, as represented by weaker
pricing controls. For example, the mean alpha for funds in which the manager provides prices is
significantly lower than that for funds that use Exchange‐based prices. And, the alphas for
funds in which the manager prices investment positions with no external oversight are not
significantly different from the alphas for funds that use Dual/Triple Entity pricing.
Furthermore, we find similar results when we control for the funds’ investment styles and
portfolio characteristics. These analyses suggest that manager skill is not a correlated omitted
variable.
4.4 Regulatory Jurisdiction
Cumming (2008) finds that variation in hedge fund regulation is associated with the
probability that reported returns are marginally positive, as opposed to zero or negative. He
argues that greater regulatory oversight provides additional value‐added governance,
eliminates lower‐quality funds, and enables engagement in surveillance. Rather than use an
indirect measure of hedge fund manager reporting discretion based on jurisdiction, we directly
observe the pricing controls employed by funds, and find variation in pricing mechanisms
conditional on the funds’ domiciles. For example, Cassar and Gerakos (2009) report variation in
several internal control choices, including pricing controls, both across and within the fund
domiciles in our sample. Nevertheless, we examine the robustness of our findings by including

12

We obtained the factors from David Hsieh’s website: http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dah/DataLibrary/TF‐FAC.xls
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the fund domicile variables in the reported analyses with indicator variables for each country
with 10 or more funds. Our results are not altered in terms of both magnitude and statistical
significance of our main coefficient estimates by the inclusion of country dummies.
4.5 Before and After Due Diligence
We assume that the relation between pricing controls and the smoothing measures is
constant over the reporting history of the fund. To investigate this assumption, we repeat the
analyses presented in Table 4 using smoothing measures estimated using returns reported
before and after the due diligence reports. One issue arises from examining only returns that
were reported either before or after the due diligence report—the sample size drops to 161
funds before the due diligence report and to 222 funds for after. 13
Table 9 Panels A and B presents ordinary least squares regressions in which the
smoothing measures are estimated using returns that reported either before or after the due
diligence report was completed. In these regressions, we include the variables for who prices
and the source of prices. The results are qualitatively similar to those presented in Table 6
except for the following point. As presented in Panel A, for returns reported before the due
diligence report, we find no differences between the smoothing measures estimated before due
diligence for who prices the investment positions. An explanation for this result is the smaller
sample size and potential differences between established funds and newly established funds
that would not be included in the tests based on returns reported prior to the due diligence
report.

The before and after sample sizes are not equivalent because we require a minimum of 12 months of returns, and
some funds initiated or terminated reporting to the commercial databases within 12 months before or after the due
diligence report was completed.
13
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4.6 Alternative Measure of Pricing Sources
In the presented analyses, we employ the least objective pricing source used by the fund
to value its investment positions. We use the least objective source to capture the discretion that
fund managers have when obtaining asset values. But, many hedge funds use multiple sources
to obtain prices (Deloitte 2007 page 15; HFWG 2007 page 18; President’s Working Group 2008
page 46). We therefore repeat the analyses using every pricing source that the fund employs.
We find that the results obtained using this alternative measure are similar to those presented
and are consequently not reported.

5. Distribution Tests
In this section, we examine whether the likelihood of reporting a small positive versus a
small negative return varies with the source of prices. This approach allows us to further
validate our identification of the effect of pricing controls on reported returns because the
liquidity of the fund’s investment is not likely to affect the likelihood of small positive vs. small
negative returns.
Bollen and Pool (2009) find a significant discontinuity around zero in the pooled
distribution of monthly hedge fund returns, with the number of small gains far exceeding the
number of small negative returns. 14 Further, they observe that there is no discontinuity in the
three months culminating in an audit, and that the presence of the discontinuity varies by some
fund investment styles. They posit that some managers distort returns and that this distortion is

14

Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) document a similar discontinuity around zero in corporate earnings.
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more likely when managers have greater discretion due to the liquidity of their invested assets
and when managers are not closely monitored.
Figure 1 presents histograms of reported returns for the full sample and for each pricing
source. To determine bin size and statistical significance, we follow Bollen and Pool (2009) and
set bin width using the Silverman’s (1986) heuristic:
1.364α min(σ , Q / 1.340) N

−

1
5

in which σ is the sample’s standard deviation, Q is its inter‐quartile range, and N is the
sample size. We assume a normal distribution and therefore set α equal to 0.776. With respect
to statistical significance we fit a Gaussian kernel and then compare the predicted vs. actual
number of observations in each bin. We determine significance using the Demoivre‐Laplance
theorem that states the number of observations in each bin is asymptotically normal. Consistent
with Bollen and Pool (2009), Panel A shows that when we pool the returns of all funds in our
sample, that small positive returns are more likely than predicted and that small negative
returns less likely than predicted, with both effects statistically significant at the five percent
level.
When we classify funds by the source of prices, we find results similar to those
presented in Table 6. Panels D and F show that for Dealer Quotes and Manager‐Provided small
positive returns are more likely than predicted and that small negative returns less likely than
predicted, with all effects statistically significant at the one percent level except for small
positive returns for Manager Provided which is significant at the 10 percent level. In contrast,
Panels B, C, and E show that for Exchange Quotes, OTC Quotes, and Model‐Based small
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positive returns are statistically more likely than predicted at the five percent level, while small
negative returns are not statistically different than predicted at the 10 percent level. In
unreported tests, we classify funds by the typical number of positions and the typical holding
period of an investment position. For these histograms, the magnitude of the jump at zero is
similar for all positions and all holding periods, suggesting that asset illiquidity does not drive
the discontinuities at zero.

6. Conclusion
We investigate the extent that hedge fund managers smooth self‐reported returns. In
contrast with prior research on the anomalous properties of hedge fund returns, we observe the
mechanisms used to price the fund’s investment positions and report the fund’s performance to
investors, thereby allowing us to differentiate between asset illiquidity and misreporting‐based
explanations. We find that funds using less verifiable pricing sources and funds that provide
managers with greater discretion in pricing investment positions are more likely to have returns
that are consistent with intentional smoothing. Traditional controls, however, such as removing
the manager from setting and reporting the fund’s net asset value and the use of reputable
auditors and administrators are not associated with lower levels of smoothing. With respect to
asset illiquidity vs. misreporting, investment style and portfolio characteristics explain 14.0–24.3
percent of the variation in our smoothing measures and pricing controls explain an additional
4.1–8.8 percent, suggesting that asset illiquidity is the major factor driving the anomalous
properties of self‐reported hedge fund returns.

33

This study extends both the hedge fund and financial reporting literatures. We extend
the hedge fund literature by estimating the magnitudes of intentional smoothing. These
estimates have important implications for investors or researchers who use reported hedge
fund returns to evaluate hedge fund investment opportunities and/or hedge funds as an asset
class. The study also extends the financial reporting literature by demonstrating how pricing
controls affect the “marking to market” of investment positions. Managerial discretion in
“marking to market” investment positions is a controversial subject given the issues associated
with recent credit crisis and the implementation of FAS 157. Our evidence demonstrates that the
effectiveness of various pricing controls in constraining managerial manipulation of mark to
market accounting.
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Appendix A
Style Classification
Style:
Convertible Arbitrage

Vendor Style
Convertible Arbitrage
Convertible Arbitrage

Vendor:
CISDM
TASS

Emerging Markets

Emerging Markets
Emerging Markets

CISDM
TASS

Equity Market Neutral

Equity Market Neutral
Market Neutral
Equity Market Neutral

CISDM
CISDM
TASS

Event Driven

Event Driven Multi Strategy
Capital Structure Arbitrage
Merger Arbitrage
Option Arbitrage
Event‐Driven
Event Driven

CISDM
CISDM
CISDM
CISDM
HFR
TASS

Fixed Income Arbitrage

Fixed Income
Fixed Income ‐ MBS
Fixed Income Arbitrage
Fixed Income Arbitrage

CISDM
CISDM
CISDM
TASS

Global Macro

Global Macro
Macro
Global Macro

CISDM
HFR
TASS

Long/Short Equity

Equity Long/Short
Equity Hedge
Long/Short Equity Hedge

CISDM
HFR
TASS

Multi‐Strategy

Relative Value Multi Strategy
Relative Value
Multi‐Strategy

CISDM
HFR
TASS

Fund of Funds

Multi Strategy
Fund of Funds
Fund of Funds

CISDM
HFR
TASS

Miscellaneous

Dedicated Short Bias
Commodity Pool Operator
Managed Futures
Equity Long Only
Regulation D
Sector
Single Strategy
Systematic

TASS
CISDM
TASS
CISDM
CISDM
CISDM
CISDM
CISDM

Appendix B
Smoothing Example
This Appendix presents an example of smoothing using a MA(2) process. Hedge fund returns for 100
months were generated from a Normal Distribution with a mean of 1 percent and a standard deviation of
2.5 percent. They were then smoothed according to the following MA(2) process:

rettSmooth = 0.7 rett + 0.2 rett − 1 + 0.1rett − 2
This smoothing process corresponds to a θ 0 of 0.70 and a ξ of 0.54. The unsmoothed and smoothed
return series have the following characteristics:
Unsmoothed
Mean (%)
Standard Deviation (%)
Sharpe Ratio
First Order Autocorrelation

0.864
2.234
0.387
‐0.049

* Significantly different from zero at the .01 level

Smoothed
0.866
1.634
0.526
0.262*

Figure 1
This Figure presents histograms of the monthly returns for the full sample (Panel A) and for each source of prices
(Panels B, C, D, E, and F). bin width using the Silverman’s (1986) heuristic:

1.364α min(σ , Q / 1.340) N
in which

σ

is the sample’s standard deviation,

Q

−

1
5

is its inter‐quartile range, and

N

is the sample size.

Panel A: All funds

Panel B: Funds the price investment positions primarily using Exchange Quotes

Figure 1 (contd.)
Panel C: Funds that price investment positions primarily using OTC Quotes

Panel D: Funds that price positions primarily using Dealer Quotes

Figure 1 (contd.)
Panel E: Funds that price positions primarily using Models

Panel F: Funds in which the manager is the primary provider of prices

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
This table presents summary statistics of the investment style, portfolio characteristics, and pricing
control measures for the 260 hedge funds in our sample. Appendix A describes the investment style
variables. 1000+ Positions, 200–999 Positions, 100–199 Positions, 40–99 Positions, and 1–39 Positions are
indicator variables for the average number of positions held in the fund’s portfolio. Years, Quarters,
Months, Weeks, and Days are indicator variables for the average holding period of a position. Fund Offshore
is and indicator variable for whether the fund is domiciled offshore. Manager Provided, Model Based, Dealer
Quotes, OTC Quotes, and Exchange Quotes are indicator variables representing the primary source of prices
used to value the fund’s investment positions. Manager Only is an indicator variable for whether the
manager prices investment positions with no outside oversight. Collaborative is an indicator variable for
whether the manager and an outside administrator collaborate on the pricing of positions. Administrator
Only is an indicator variable for whether only an outside administrator prices the positions. Dual/Triple
Entity is an indicator variable for whether the fund uses at least one internal service and one external
service to price the portfolio. NAV Manager is an indicator variable for whether the manager is involved
in reporting of the net asset value to the fund’s investors. Auditor Not Ranked and Administrator Not Ranked
are indicator variables for whether the fund’s auditor and administrator are not included Institutional
Investor’s Alpha Magazine annual lists of top hedge fund service providers.
Panel A:
Variable (%)
Investment Style:
Convertible Arbitrage
Emerging Markets
Equity Market Neutral
Event Driven
Fixed Income Arbitrage
Global Macro
Long/ Short Equity
Multi‐Strategy
Fund of Funds
Miscellaneous

Panel B:
Overall
5
5
3
15
6
10
29
13
11
5

Portfolio Characteristics:
1000+ Positions
200–999 Positions
100–199 Positions
40–99 Positions
1–39 Positions

3
5
13
38
42

Years
Quarters
Months
Weeks
Days
Fund Offshore

35
35
13
8
10
83

Variable (%)
Source of Prices:
Manager Provided
Model Based
Dealer Quotes
OTC Quotes
Exchange Quotes

Overall
16
11
36
5
32

Who Prices Positions:
Manager Only
Collaborative
Administrator Only
Dual/Triple Entity

20
12
60
9

Other:
NAV Manager
Auditor Not Ranked
Administrator Not Ranked

14
23
68

Table 2
Pricing Controls Conditional on Investment Style and Portfolio Characteristics
This table presents distributions of the pricing controls measures conditional on investment styles and
portfolio characteristics. Panel A presents the conditional distributions of pricing sources. Panel B
presents the conditional distributions of who prices the investment positions. Panel C presents the
conditional distributions of NAV Manager, Auditor Not Ranked, and Administrator Not Ranked. Variable
definitions are provided in the notes to Table 1.
Panel A: Source of Prices
Variable (%)

Manager

Model

Dealer

OTC

Exchange

Investment Style:
Convertible Arbitrage
Emerging Markets
Equity Market Neutral
Event Driven
Fixed Income Arbitrage
Global Macro
Long/ Short Equity
Multi‐Strategy
Fund of Funds
Miscellaneous

0
15
0
26
0
0
1
12
79
17

8
38
0
8
33
0
9
15
0
25

92
46
0
58
60
32
16
61
11
17

0
0
13
0
7
28
4
0
0
0

0
0
88
8
0
40
69
12
11
42

Portfolio Characteristics:
1000+ Positions
200–999 Positions
100–199 Positions
40–99 Positions
1–39 Positions
Years
Quarters
Months
Weeks
Days
Fund Offshore

43
15
3
11
22
30
8
6
5
16
14

14
23
9
10
11
16
9
11
5
8
11

0
31
41
43
31
36
39
34
45
24
40

0
8
3
3
6
1
6
11
5
4
5

43
23
44
33
29
18
39
37
40
48
31

Table 2 (continued)
Pricing Controls Conditional on Investment Style and Portfolio Characteristics
Panel B: Who Prices Positions
Variable (%)

Manager

Collaborative

Administrator

Dual /Triple

Investment Style:
Convertible Arbitrage
Emerging Markets
Equity Market Neutral
Event Driven
Fixed Income Arbitrage
Global Macro
Long/ Short Equity
Multi‐Strategy
Fund of Funds
Miscellaneous

23
38
13
21
40
8
9
24
21
42

8
8
0
32
13
4
8
12
0
25

69
54
87
29
33
68
76
55
75
25

0
0
0
18
13
20
7
9
4
8

Portfolio Characteristics:
1000+ Positions
200–999 Positions
100–199 Positions
40–99 Positions
1–39 Positions
Years
Quarters
Months
Weeks
Days
Fund Offshore

14
31
9
19
22
20
18
29
15
16
15

29
8
9
10
13
9
11
17
5
20
13

57
54
68
64
54
63
62
49
60
52
63

0
8
15
6
11
8
9
6
20
12
10

Table 2 (continued)
Pricing Controls Conditional on Investment Style and Portfolio Characteristics
Panel C: NAV No Manager, Auditor Ranked, and Administrator Ranked
NAV
Manager

Auditor
Not Ranked

Administrator
Not Ranked

Investment Style:
Convertible Arbitrage
Emerging Markets
Equity Market Neutral
Event Driven
Fixed Income Arbitrage
Global Macro
Long/ Short Equity
Multi‐Strategy
Fund of Funds
Miscellaneous

23
8
12
24
33
4
9
21
18
25

23
8
25
21
20
20
19
30
25
50

77
69
62
66
87
64
56
79
75
75

Portfolio Characteristics:
1000+ Positions
200–999 Positions
100–199 Positions
40–99 Positions
1–39 Positions
Years
Quarters
Months
Weeks
Days
Fund Offshore

14
31
6
21
13
19
10
26
15
16
9

14
31
18
19
27
28
19
14
20
32
18

43
77
62
66
71
68
71
76
40
68
63

Variable (%)

Table 3
Summary Statistics of Smoothing Measures
This table presents summary statistics of the three smoothing measures used in the empirical analyses.
The first measure is the monthly first order serial correlation ( ρ̂1 ) of reported returns, which we estimate
over the entire history of returns available on either the Lipper‐TASS, Hedge Fund Research, or CISDM
databases. To estimate the other two measures, we follow Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) and
assume that actual monthly performance innovations are independently and normally distributed, but
are smoothed using a Moving Average model with two lags:

Xt = θ 0ηt + θ1ηt −1 + θ 2ηt − 2
1 = θ 0 + θ1 + θ 2
η k ~ Nor (0, σ η2 )

We estimate the MA(2) coefficients using Maximum Likelihood and then transform the estimated
coefficients by dividing each θˆi by 1 + θˆ1 + θˆ2 to normalize them. Our second smoothing measure is the
first coefficient θˆ0 from the above estimation. θˆ0 represents the percentage of the month’s actual
performance innovation that is included in the reported return. Our third measure is the Herfindahl
Index measure of the concentration of the θ k weights:
2

ξ = ∑ θ j2
j =0

Lower values of ξ represent greater smoothing. We winsorize all three measures to the 1st and 99th
percentiles. Panel A presents summary statistics for the three smoothing measures and Panel B presents
their Pearson correlations.
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Q1

Median

Q3

N

Serial Correlation ( ρ̂1 )

0.247

0.196

0.111

0.223

0.402

260

Theta Coefficient ( θˆ0 )

0.767

0.194

0.623

0.739

0.881

260

Smoothing Index ( ξˆ )
Months

0.694

0.301

0.475

0.595

0.808

260

79.996

36.868

56.000

72.000

97.500

260

ρ̂1

θˆ0

ξˆ

Panel B: Pearson Correlations
Serial Correlation ( ρ̂1 )
Theta Coefficient ( θˆ0 )
Smoothing Index ( ξˆ )

1.000

‐0.838

‐0.757

1.000

0.960
1.000

Table 4
Univariate Tests of Pricing Controls and Smoothing Measures
This table presents means for the three smoothing measures classified by the pricing controls. Differences
between means are tested using two‐sided t tests. Variable definitions for the pricing controls are
provided in Table 1. Variable definitions for the smoothing measures are provided in Table 3.
Mean
Variable

ρ̂1

b

ξˆ

Source of Prices:
Manager Provided
Model Based
Dealer Quotes
OTC Quotes
Exchange Quotes

0.326
0.268
0.311
0.174a, c
0.139a, b, c

0.682
0.747
0.706
0.876 a, b, c
0.867 a, b, c

0.569
0.661
0.613
0.846 a, b, c
0.836 a, b, c

Who Prices:
Manager Only
Collaborative
Administrator Only
Dual/Triple Entity

0.278
0.294
0.234
0.204 e

0.732
0.738
0.772
0.843 d, e, f

0.632
0.655
0.702
0.825 d, e, f

NAV:
Manager Involved
Manager Not Involved

0.270
0.242

0.758
0.769

0.680
0.697

Auditor:
Not Ranked
Ranked

0.221
0.254

0.773
0.765

0.712
0.689

Administrator:
Not Ranked
Ranked

0.251
0.237

0.763
0.775

0.691
0.701

Significantly different from Manager Provided at the .05 level
Significantly different from Model Based at the .05 level
c Significantly different from Dealer Quotes at the .05 level
d Significantly different from Manager Only at the .10 level
e Significantly different from Collaborative at the .10 level
f Significantly different from Administrator Only at the .10 level
a

θˆ0

Table 5
Benchmark Specification
This table presents ordinary least squares regressions that use the smoothing measures as the dependent
variable, but exclude the pricing controls. The omitted categories are Miscellaneous, 1–39 Positions, and
Days. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Variable definitions for the smoothing measures are
provided in Table 3.
Dependent Variable:
Convertible Arbitrage
Emerging Markets
Equity Market Neutral
Event Driven
Fixed Income Arbitrage
Global Macro
Long/ Short Equity
Multi‐Strategy
Fund of Funds
1000+ Positions
200–999 Positions
100–199 Positions
40–99 Positions
Years
Quarters
Month
Weeks
Fund Offshore
Intercept
R2
Adj. R2
p Value
Number of Funds

ρ̂1
0.288***
(0.074)
0.134*
(0.072)
‐0.030
(0.089)
0.166***
(0.060)
0.124*
(0.070)
‐0.049
(0.065)
‐0.002
(0.057)
0.172***
(0.062)
0.128*
(0.077)
‐0.018
(0.077)
‐0.014
(0.058)
0.029
(0.038)
0.007
(0.027)
0.004
(0.045)
0.019
(0.044)
0.003
(0.051)
‐0.004
(0.056)
0.022
(0.031)
0.133*
(0.071)
0.243
0.186
0.000
260

θˆ0
‐0.280***
(0.077)
‐0.188**
(0.074)
‐0.003
(0.092)
‐0.198***
(0.061)
‐0.175**
(0.072)
‐0.027
(0.067)
‐0.088
(0.059)
‐0.210***
(0.064)
‐0.169***
(0.064)
‐0.007
(0.080)
‐0.020
(0.060)
‐0.030
(0.039)
0.004
(0.028)
‐0.016
(0.047)
‐0.031
(0.045)
0.033
(0.052)
‐0.033
(0.058)
‐0.016
(0.032)
0.933***
(0.073)
0.177
0.116
0.000
260

ξˆ
‐0.398***
(0.121)
‐0.328***
(0.118)
‐0.048
(0.146)
‐0.292***
(0.097)
‐0.302***
(0.114)
‐0.052
(0.106)
‐0.174*
(0.094)
‐0.302***
(0.101)
‐0.255**
(0.101)
‐0.060
(0.126)
‐0.050
(0.094)
‐0.049
(0.061)
0.004
(0.044)
‐0.034
(0.074)
‐0.044
(0.072)
0.046
(0.083)
‐0.045
(0.092)
‐0.014
(0.050)
0.958***
(0.116)
0.140
0.076
0.004
260

***, **, * Significantly different from zero at the .01, .05, and .10 level,

Table 6
Multivariate Tests of Pricing Controls and Smoothing Measures
This table presents multivariate tests of the association between the pricing controls and the smoothing
measures. Regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares and include the control variables used in
Table 5. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The omitted pricing control categories are Exchange
Quotes and Dual/Triple Entity. Panel A present results for Serial Correlation. Panel B presents results for Theta
Coefficient. Panel C presents results for the Smoothing Index
Panel A: Serial Correlation
Dependent Variable: ρ̂1
(1)
Source of Prices:
Manager Provided
Model Based
Dealer Quotes
OTC Quotes

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.142***
(0.046)
0.076*
(0.044)
0.086**
(0.035)
0.071
(0.058)

Who Prices:
Manager Only

Administrator Only

NAV Manager

0.036
(0.051)
0.028
(0.052)
0.031
(0.041)
0.002
(0.034)

Auditor Not Ranked

‐0.032
(0.028)

Administrator Not Ranked
0.277
0.210
0.000
260
Yes

(6)
0.141***
(0.049)
0.082*
(0.046)
0.081**
(0.037)
0.073
(0.059)

0.054
(0.047)
0.062
(0.050)
0.039
(0.041)

Collaborative

R2
Adj. R2
p Value
Number of Funds
Controls Included

(5)

0.249
0.182
0.000
260
Yes

***, **, * Significantly different from zero at the .01, .05, and .10 level,

0.243
0.183
0.000
260
Yes

0.247
0.187
0.000
260
Yes

‐0.012
(0.025)
0.244
0.184
0.000
260
Yes

‐0.004
(0.043)
‐0.036
(0.029)
‐0.011
(0.025)
0.284
0.198
0.000
260
Yes

Table 6 (continued)
Multivariate Tests of Pricing Controls and Smoothing Measures
Panel B: Theta Coefficient
Dependent Variable: θˆ0
(1)
Source of Prices:
Manager Provided
Model Based
Dealer Quotes
OTC Quotes

(2)

(3)

(4)

‐0.202***
(0.047)
‐0.106**
(0.044)
‐0.126***
(0.035)
‐0.024
(0.059)

Who Prices:
Manager Only

Administrator Only

NAV Manager

‐0.087*
(0.051)
‐0.042
(0.052)
‐0.068
(0.042)
0.0002
(0.036)

Auditor Not Ranked

0.001
(0.029)

Administrator Not Ranked
0.246
0.176
0.000
260
Yes

(6)
‐0.195***
(0.049)
‐0.110**
(0.046)
‐0.125***
(0.037)
‐0.031
(0.059)

‐0.115**
(0.048)
‐0.101*
(0.051)
‐0.083**
(0.042)

Collaborative

R2
Adj. R2
p Value
Number of Funds
Controls Included

(5)

0.198
0.128
0.000
260
Yes

0.177
0.112
0.000
260
Yes

***, **, * Significantly different from zero at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level

0.177
0.112
0.000
260
Yes

‐0.0004
(0.026)
0.177
0.112
0.000
260
Yes

0.020
(0.043)
0.004
(0.029)
0.003
(0.026)
0.258
0.169
0.000
260
Yes

Table 6 (continued)
Multivariate Tests of Pricing Controls and Smoothing Measures
Panel C: Smoothing Index
Dependent Variable: ξˆ
(1)
Source of Prices:
Manager Provided
Model
Dealer Quotes
OTC Quotes

(2)

(3)

(4)

‐0.323***
(0.075)
‐0.163**
(0.070)
‐0.202***
(0.056)
‐0.050
(0.093)

Who Prices:
Manager Only

Administrator Only

NAV Manager

‐0.161**
(0.081)
‐0.074
(0.083)
‐0.105
(0.066)
‐0.002
(0.056)

Auditor Not Ranked

0.009
(0.046)

Administrator Not Ranked
0.213
0.140
0.000
260
Yes

(6)
‐0.307***
(0.078)
‐0.165**
(0.073)
‐0.196***
(0.059)
‐0.059
(0.094)

‐0.198***
(0.076)
‐0.165**
(0.081)
‐0.131**
(0.066)

Collaborative

R2
Adj. R2
p Value
Number of Funds
Controls Included

(5)

0.165
0.092
0.002
260
Yes

***, **, * Significantly different from zero at the .01, .05, and .10 level

0.140
0.072
0.007
260
Yes

0.140
0.072
0.007
260
Yes

0.003
(0.042)
0.140
0.072
0.007
260
Yes

0.043
(0.068)
0.015
(0.046)
0.009
(0.041)
0.228
0.135
0.000
260
Yes

Table 7
Within the Event Driven Style
This table presents for Event Driven funds the means of the three smoothing measures classified by the pricing
controls. No Event Driven funds in the sample source prices from OTC Quotes. Differences between means
are tested using two‐sided t tests. Variable definitions for the pricing controls are provided in Table 1. Variable
definitions for the smoothing measures are provided in Table 3.
Mean

ρ̂1

θˆ0

ξˆ

Source of Prices:
Manager Provided
Model Based
Dealer Quotes
Exchange Quotes

0.368
0.104a
0.354b
0.280

0.615
0.932a
0.698b
0.837a

0.496
0.979a
0.601b
0.843a

Who Prices:
Manager Only
Collaborative
Administrator Only
Dual/Triple Entity

0.384
0.343
0.316
0.280

0.645
0.732
0.661
0.799

0.523
0.661
0.542
0.795c,d

Variable

Number of Funds

38

Significantly different from Manager Provided at the .10 level
b Significantly different from Model Based at the .05 level
c Significantly different from Manager Only at the .10 level
d Significantly different from Administrator Only at the .10 level
a

Table 8
Manager Skill and Pricing Controls
This table presents mean alphas tabulated the by the funds’ pricing controls. The alphas estimated over the life
the fund using Fung and Hsieh’s eight factor model: the returns of S&P 500, the small capitalization minus
large capitalization factor, the bond trend following factor, the currency trend following factor, the commodity
trend following factor, the stock index trend following factor, the bond market factor, and the credit spread
factor.
Mean
Variable

α̂

Source of Prices:
Manager Provided
Model Based
Dealer Quotes
OTC Quotes
Exchange Quotes

0.00545
0.01288a,b
0.00882a,b
0.00561b
0.00833a,b

Who Prices:
Manager Only
Collaborative
Administrator Only
Dual/Triple Entity

0.00916
0.01210c
0.00756d
0.00809d

Significantly different from Manager Provided at the .05 level
Significantly different from Model Based at the .05 level
c Significantly different from Manager Only at the .05 level
d Significantly different from Collaborative at the .05 level
e Significantly different from Administrator Only at the .05 level
a

b

Table 9
Before and After the Due Diligence Report
This table presents multivariate tests of the association between the pricing controls and the smoothing
measures estimated using returns reported before and after the due diligence report was completed.
Regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares and include the control variables used in Table 5.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The omitted pricing control categories are Exchange Quotes and
Dual/Triple Entity.
Panel A: Before the Due Diligence Report

ρ̂1

Dependent Variable:
(1)
Source of Prices:
Manager Provided
Model Based
Dealer Quotes
OTC Quotes

(2)

0.092*
(0.052)
0.043
(0.057)
0.055
(0.043)
0.036
(0.067)

Who Prices:
Manager Only
Collaborative
Administrator Only
R2
Adj. R2
p Value
Number of Funds
Controls Included

θˆ0

0.289
0.176
0.001
161
Yes

(3)

ξˆ
(4)

‐0.091
(0.063)
‐0.094)
(0.068
‐0.124*
(0.051)
‐0.062
(0.081)

‐0.053
(0.065)
‐0.043
(0.065)
‐0.049
(0.058)
0.276
0.166
0.001
161
Yes

***, **, * Significantly different from zero at the .01, .05, and .10 level,

0.283
0.169
0.001
161
Yes

(5)

(6)

‐0.205**
(0.100)
‐0.188*
(0.109)
‐0.234***
(0.082)
‐0.079
(0.128)

0.013
(0.079)
‐0.007
(0.079)
0.007
(0.071)
0.252
0.139
0.003
161
Yes

0.277
0.161
0.001
161
Yes

‐0.038
(0.127)
‐0.034
(0.126)
‐0.023
(0.114)
0.233
0.117
0.009
161
Yes

Table 9 (continued)
Before and After the Due Diligence Report
Panel B: After the Due Diligence Report

ρ̂1

Dependent Variable:
(1)
Source of Prices:
Manager Provided
Model Based
Dealer Quotes
OTC Quotes

(2)

0.187***
(0.057)
0.086*
(0.052)
0.078*
(0.041)
‐0.033
(0.071)

Who Prices:
Manager Only
Collaborative
Administrator Only
R2
Adj. R2
p Value
Number of Funds
Controls Included

θˆ0

0.264
0.182
0.000
222
Yes

(3)

ξˆ
(4)

‐0.280***
(0.062)
‐0.150***
(0.056)
‐0.139***
(0.045)
0.090
(0.078)

0.029
(0.058)
0.037
(0.064)
0.023
(0.051)
0.221
0.136
0.000
222
Yes

***, **, * Significantly different from zero at the .01, .05, and .10 level,

0.238
0.154
0.000
222
Yes

(5)

(6)

‐0.481***
(0.100)
‐0.272***
(0.091)
‐0.237***
(0.073)
0.132
(0.125)

‐0.117*
(0.064)
‐0.109*
(0.071)
‐0.098
(0.056)
0.156
0.067
0.025
222
Yes

0.233
0.148
0.000
222
Yes

‐0.248**
(0.104)
‐0.241**
(0.115)
0.165*
(0.091)
0.150
0.061
0.036
222
Yes

